Network verification promises to detect errors, such as black holes and forwarding loops, by logically analyzing the control or data plane. To do so efficiently, the state-of-the-art (e.g., Veriflow) partitions packet headers with identical forwarding behavior into the same packet equivalence class (PEC).
I. INTRODUCTION
In complex networks, misconfigurations continue to be common [1] , [2] , causing costly unscheduled outages or compromising security [3] - [5] . This has generated significant interest in formally analyzing network behavior on the control (e.g., [6] - [9] ) or data plane (e.g., [10] - [15] ), a class of formal methods collectively known as network verification. In this paper, we provide a new algorithm and data structure that can serve as a foundation for both forms of network verification.
What make network verification interesting is its predictive power: it promises to find network-related errors that traditional diagnostic tools, such as ping and traceroute, in general cannot. To accomplish this feat, network verification creates a mathematical model of the network to logically analyze the packet forwarding behavior of packets, rather than merely observing network traffic. This is an inherently difficult task: even reachability checking in the data plane is NP-hard [10] . Much research therefore has gone into making formal network analysis as efficient as possible. * This work was completed at Fujitsu Laboratories of America.
First-generation formal network analysis tools (e.g., [10] , [16] - [24] ) rely on SAT/SMT solvers, highly optimized backtracking decision procedures for solving propositional or firstorder logic problems. However, SAT/SMT solvers are too slow to enumerate all witnesses of each network property violation [25] , and SAT/SMT solvers tend to perform poorly on reachability queries over many distinct network paths [15] .
This bottleneck prompted second-generation formal network analysis techniques to use a geometric model for packet classification instead, notably in the form of Header Space Analysis (HSA) [11] , [12] , [26] . At its core, HSA represents packet headers as the difference of cubes in a multidimensional hyperspace. While compact, a significant drawback of HSA's difference of hypercube representation is that it is computationally expensive to evaluate in general. This explains why HSA uses a lazy evaluation strategy, which still has performance problems (akin to lazy functional languages).
By contrast, third-generation formal network analysis tools avoid the problems of lazy evaluation by pre-computing a family of disjoint sets of packet headers. We call these packet equivalence classes (PECs). Intuitively, each PEC contains packet headers that experience the same forwarding behavior through the network at each router-a form of lossless compression that has been shown to make formal network analysis more efficient in both time and space [27] . 1 Formal network analysis tools based on PECs include Veriflow [30] , APV [27] , ddNF [28] and Delta-net [14] , all of which detect a myriad of network errors-such as black holes, forwarding loops, reachability and isolation violations-and PECs help to do so in a vendor-agnostic manner. In this paper, we focus on Veriflow [30] , APV [27] and ddNF [28] . These tools can encode match conditions with possibly many packet header fields, so-called multi-dimensional match conditions.
However, reasoning about multi-dimensional match conditions in a priority-ordered list (such as a forwarding table) is challenging, because a higher-priority rule x may overlap with a lower-priority rule y. Such overlapping amounts to logical negation (i.e., y ∧ ¬x), because x needs to be subtracted from y. The crux of the problem is that logical negations can lead to an exponential number of case splits. Consider some packet header filter that uses the match condition 1 * 1 * 0, an instance of a Ternary Bit Vector (TBV) where ' * ' matches either '1' or Our paper answers this question in the affirmative through a new lattice-theoretical PEC-construction algorithm ( § III), #PEC, that combines the precision and expressiveness of atomic predicates with the scalability of ddNF. #PEC is more expressive than Veriflow and ddNF, because its encoding is not tied to TBVs. As a result, for instance, #PEC can check match conditions with arbitrary ranges, e.g., iptables rule-sets. Moreover, #PEC can detect errors, such as shadowed rules, that ddNF cannot in general, since its analysis is imprecise.
We show that ddNF's imprecision is due to PECs that are empty. We detect such empty PECs-a coNP-hard problemby efficiently counting the packet headers in each PEC. This way #PEC achieves full precision, and it does so 10 − 100× faster than SAT/SMT and BDD-based solutions that encode the PEC-emptiness problem into propositional logic. Moreover, by detecting empty PECs, #PEC constructs PECs that are unique and minimal ( § III-F), achieving the optimality of atomic predicates, but at least 10× faster than APV ( § IV).
To avoid the aforementioned limitations of TBVs and multidimensional trie data structures, we organize packet headers in a meet-semilattice [34] ( § III-B). Through this latticetheoretical framework, #PEC can formally analyze a strictly broader class of forwarding filters than ddNF and Veriflow.
By achieving precision, expressiveness and performance, we answer a longstanding quest that has spanned three generations of formal network analysis techniques. We start by giving background on formal network analysis ( § II-A), illustrating why achieving expressiveness ( § II-B) and precision ( § II-C) at the same time is challenging.
A. Background: Formal Network Analysis
In this subsection, we explain through illustrations what makes multi-dimensional match conditions challenging to formally analyze. Readers familiar with PEC-based formal network analysis may wish to skip this subsection for now.
Consider two physically connected routers ν 1 and ν 2 . The network operator wants to check the absence of forwarding loops between ν 1 and ν 2 . Assume that ν 2 forwards packets to ν 1 according to the forwarding table in Figure 1 . This forwarding table has three priority-ordered rules: 1 , 2 and 3 , where 1 has highest priority. Since the match conditions of 1 , 2 and 3 filter packets based on three packet header fields, they are instances of 3-dimensional match conditions.
Consider the lowest-priority rule 3 in Figure 1 . It is not difficult to see that the set of packets matched by 3 correspond to the logic formula 3 ∧¬ 1 ∧¬ 2 . This formula says that 3 matches only packet headers that are not matched by 1 or 2 , thereby encoding the fact that both 1 and 2 have a higher priority than 3 .
To understand the significance of such logic formulas, assume that ν 1 forwards to ν 2 all packets matched by either 1 , 2 or 3 , i.e., 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 . Abstractly, formal analysis tools essentially reason about the forwarding behavior of a network in terms of a directed graph whose edges are annotated by such logic formulas (or PECs as we shall see), as illustrated in Figure 2 . The existence of a forwarding loop between ν 1 and ν 2 depends on whether the logic formula
is satisfiable or not; equivalently, does there exist a packet header such that formula φ can evaluate to true?
The challenge for PEC-based formal analysis tools is to be able to express complex multi-dimensional match conditions, while also being able to efficiently and precisely solve the resulting constraint systems via PECs. Unlike SAT/SMT solvers, PECs give by default the set of all such solutions (if any). What does a solution to this challenge entail? To answer this, consider Figure 3a , a geometric view of the three match conditions in Figure 1 . Since there are 3-dimensional match conditions, Figure 3a has three axes: the x-axis and y-axis correspond to the range of the source and destination IP addresses, respectively, whereas the z-axis evenly divides the space into UDP and non-UDP packets. The color of each rectangular cuboid corresponds to 1 , 2 and 3 . The key idea behind PECs is to divide the whole geometric space into disjoint sub-spaces prior to the analysis.
Note that each overlapping of cuboids corresponds to an overlapping of a pair of rules. In general, however, reasoning about the intersection of higher-dimensional cuboids, as in Figure 3a , is NP-hard. For example, there is no forwarding loop between ν 1 and ν 2 , since the 3-dimensional space denoted by φ is in fact empty, an instance of an NP-hard query.
B. Challenge: Expressiveness
Notice that the highest-priority rule 1 in Figure 1 complements an individual packet header field. That is, 1 matches only non-UDP packet headers whose source and destination IP address match 0.0.0.4/30 and 0.0.0.0/28, respectively. However, the PEC-construction schemes in Veriflow and ddNF are not designed for multi-dimensional match conditions with arbitrary ranges, sets of values, or their complements (all of which can be found in iptables rule-sets [33] ).
Veriflow and ddNF's limitation is due to the fact that they are tied to TBVs, where Veriflow represents TBVs as a trie data structure with nodes that can have three children for '0', '1' and ' * ' [35] . The problem is that a single TBV cannot represent match conditions such as the non-UDP example above. As another instance, an arbitrary range that is not an IP prefix can only be represented by multiple TBVs. This renders the TBV representation of match conditions inefficient and impractical. By contrast, #PEC can efficiently encode such match conditions via element types ( § III-B). While APV can represent the same match conditions as #PEC, APV's reliance on BDDs makes it at least 10× slower than #PEC ( § IV-D).
C. Challenge: Precision and Minimality of PECs
For ddNF to be able to analyze the network in Figure 2 , let us further simplify the example by replacing the the three Figure 1 accordingly, where each rule now only matches packets based on longest IP prefix matching-something that ddNF is designed to handle. We remark that our simplification preserves a vital characteristic of the example: reasoning about it requires only two PECs, which form atomic predicates by definition ( § III-F).
However, ddNF constructs three PECs, denoted by uppercase letters: X and Y that represent all IP addresses in x = 10.57.0.0/19, y = 10.57.32.0/19, respectively, and Z for all IP addresses in z = 10.57.0.0/18, except those IP addresses in x and y. By construction, X, Y and Z are disjoint, so {X, Y, Z} is indeed a set of PECs.
The crux of the problem is that {X, Y, Z} is not minimal, because there is a PEC that is empty, namely Z. To illustrate the impact of this superfluous PEC, consider Figure 4 . Notice that each edge in Figure 4 has a corresponding edge in Figure 2 . The problem is that ddNF's PEC construction fails to precisely capture the Boolean formulas along the edges in Figure 2 : ddNF wrongly reports a forwarding loop between ν 1 and ν 2 , because the edges in Figure 4 labelled by Z (shown in bold) form a spurious cycle. This cycle is spurious, and therefore leads to a false alarm, because the conjunction of the corresponding Boolean formulas in Figure 2 is unsatisfiable. 2 In addition to false alarms, ddNF's limitation can also manifest itself as a failure to detect network-related errors: in our example, ddNF will not detect that the last rule in Figure 2 is shadowed. 3 The possibility for both false alarms as well as false negatives means that ddNF comes with the overhead to always sanity check its results, a serious limitation ( § IV-C).
Our experiments ( § IV) show that #PEC is 10−100× faster than alternative SAT/SMT solvers and BDD-based solutions for detecting empty PECs. To achieve this speedup, #PEC exploits the fact that it is enough to find the number of packets in a PEC to check the PEC's emptiness, rather than finding a witness for its non-emptiness. This reveals, in particular, that in the context of formal network analysis counting is much faster than backtracking on a wide range of realistic datasets.
III. LATTICE-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we highlight the technical approach behind #PEC ( § III-A), before explaining its data structures ( § III-B-III-C) and PEC-construction algorithm ( § III-D). We explain how to answer queries in #PEC ( § III-E). Finally, we show that #PEC constructs the minimal set of PECs ( § III-F).
A. Technical Approach
To illustrate our approach, reconsider the match conditions 1 , 2 and 3 in Figure 1 . Recall that 1 complements an individual packet header field. We can represent such and other match conditions by so-called element types (Figure 7) .
The geometric interpretation ( § II-A) we considered in Figure 2 was only in three dimensions. In general, the geometric view is unfeasible, since it requires reasoning about hypercubes as the number of packet header fields increases. Instead, #PEC constructs a meet-semilattice, a form of partially ordered set in which every finite subset of elements has a greatest lower bound [34] . In doing so, #PEC is able to represent match conditions that ddNF and Veriflow cannot, while also achieving precision and performance, as described below. Figure 3b shows the Hasse diagram of the meet-semilattice produced by #PEC, given the match conditions in Figure 1 .
A Hasse diagram has an edge from a vertex v to a vertex u whenever u is a subset of v (written u ⊂ v), and there is no other vertex w such that u ⊂ w ⊂ v. In other words, only non-transitive edges are included in the Hasse diagram. Figure 5 gives the more familiar interpretation of the elements in the meet-semilattice as match conditions. Note that the color of the rows in Figure 5 corresponds to the coloring of the corresponding match conditions in Figure 1 .
Observe that the meet-semilattice in Figure 3b contains more elements than there are match conditions. Intuitively, the reason is that the meet-semilattice describes the overlapping of all match conditions. This intuition is made precise by the requirement that every meet-semilattice is closed under intersection: it must contain every element that is the result of intersecting sets of other elements. For example, elements e and f are in the meet-semilattice because e = b ∩ c and f = c ∩ d , respectively. The last two rows in Figure 5 give a more familiar interpretation of elements e and f . #PEC bases its meet-semilattice construction on the algorithm in [36] , but with a twist: we maintain the cardinality of each PEC-the number of packet headers in each PEC. Crucially, an empty PEC has cardinality zero. This way, #PEC detects that e ∪ f = c , which ddNF cannot. Figure 3b cardinality computation uses the structure of the semilattice and harnesses the computing power of ALUs [37] (IV-D2). Next, we discuss the technical details behind #PEC, specifically: its data structures for representing match conditions ( § III-B) and PECs ( § III-C), as well as its algorithm that use these data structures to compute PECs ( § III-D) and answer a network operator's queries about the network ( § III-E).
B. Representation of Match Conditions via Element Types
At its core, #PEC features an abstract data type for match conditions, called element type, which strictly generalizes the expressiveness of Veriflow and ddNF's TBVs. For example, using element types, we encode the match conditions in Figure 5 as 3-tuples F 1 , F 2 , F 3 where F 1 and F 2 denote ranges of source and destination IP addresses, respectively, whereas F 3 denotes a set of protocols where '!' on the protocol field is encoded by efficiently complementing a bitset.
For its generalization, #PEC imposes only two basic requirements on element types: elements must form a finite partially ordered set, whose cardinality must be computable in polynomial time. Figure 7 shows fundamental element types used in practice that satisfy these requirements where the partial ordering corresponds to the usual subset inclusion order. For example, if x and y are of type ip_prefix, x ⊆ y means that every IP address in x appears also in y.
Each element type features three operators: equality (=), intersection (∩), and cardinality. All element types in Figure 7 can be efficiently implemented using data structures that use contiguous memory, and our implementations have therefore high cache locality, similar to TBVs in ddNF. We remark that since x ⊆ y holds exactly if x ∩ y = x, the subset-inclusion operator (⊆) is derived automatically, a default implementation that can be optionally optimized.
Some element types such as disjoint_ranges and set<T> where T is a fixed-size type, support a complement ('!') operator. This allows for more complex match conditions, such as complements on protocol fields as in Figure 5 . By contrast, the tuple element type has no complement operator because it is computationally too expensive [11] . More generally, by introducing element types, #PEC can tightly control the use and effects of complements, allowing only forms of negation that can be efficiently implemented.
Example. The match conditions in Figure 1 , and the corresponding meet-semilattice elements in Figure 5 , can be represented by 3-tuples of element type tuple<ip_prefix, ip_prefix, set<protocol>> where protocol is an enumeration type. Alternatively, if there is no need to be able to complement the protocol header field, the last tuple component could be also replaced by optional<protocol>.
C. PEC-representation as a DAG
#PEC represents the Hasse diagram of a meet-semilattice as a directed acylic graph (DAG). Since such a Hasse diagram can be shown to be unique up to graph isomorphism [34] , so is the DAG that #PEC constructs using the later algorithm.
Therefore, #PEC represents each PEC by a pointer to a DAG node. Each such PEC denotes the packet headers that are in the element associated with the pointed to DAG node, minus the elements in its children. For example, given the meet-semilattice in Figure 3b , uppercase letter A denotes the PEC that includes the packet headers in a, excluding those in b , c and d . Figure 6 defines the other PECs similarly. By construction, all PECs are pair-wise disjoint. For example, the intersection of the PECs B and C in Figure 3b is empty, whereas b ∩ c is non-empty. Each node n in the DAG has the following three fields: (i) n.elem denotes the match condition associated with n; (ii) n.children contains all the DAG nodes c such that c = n and c.elem ⊆ n.elem and there is no other DAG node c such that n = c = c and c.elem ⊆ c .elem ⊆ n.elem; (iii) n.cardinality corresponds to the number of packet headers in the PEC denoted by n. Example. Let n a be the root node of the DAG in Figure 3b such that n a .elem = a and n a .children = {n b , n c , n d }. Note that neither n f and n e are in n a .children, because they are not direct children of n a . We shall see that #PEC computes n c .cardinality = 0, i.e., the PEC denoted by n c is empty.
D. Algorithm for Computing PECs
The algorithm of #PEC is divided into three procedures, each of which accesses the global variable Modified Nodes that determines what PEC-cardinalities need to be recomputed. We explain each procedure in turn.
The main procedure, INSERT (Algorithm 1), takes as input an element-a match condition of the kind as explained in § III-B-that is to be added into the meet-semilattice. To do so, INSERT calls FIND OR CREATE NODE(element) which uses a hash table (not shown) to determine when a new DAG node n, satisfying n.elem = element, has to be created or not. Only in the former case, when new = true, is n inserted into Modified Nodes and the subprocedures INSERT NODE and COMPUTE CARDINALITY are called, as discussed next.
To insert a new node n into the DAG that represents the Hasse diagram of the meet-semilattice, INSERT NODE is called on the root of the DAG. Intuitively, INSERT NODE (Algorithm 2) works by case analysis on the three possible partial orderings between a pair of nodes (line 4, 6 and 9). By using max children, we only add a child c to a parent provided that c's element is maximal with respect to the other children elements in Γ (line 20 and 21-23), thereby ensuring that all children of a parent remain mutually incomparable.
The correctness of the induced updates to the DAG edges (line 17, 22 and 23) follows directly from the proof in [36] , since we only augment the algorithm by maintaining what nodes have been modified along the way (see Modified Nodes on line 18 and 15). There may be multiple such nodes when the insertion of a single new match condition requires multiple DAG nodes to be created, due to the requirement that the lattice be closed under meets, as illustrated next.
Example. Consider the DAG in Figure 8a whose nodes correspond to the elements a through e in Figure 8c , and suppose we want to insert element f now. For clarity in what follows, let n p denote a DAG node that satisfies n p .elem = p. As expected, the call INSERT(f ) creates DAG node n f . However, it also creates n g and n h for elements g and h in Figure 8c , respectively, since b ∩ f = g and d ∩ g = h; hence, Modified Nodes = {n a , n b , n d , n f , n g , n h }. The resulting DAG is shown in Figure 8b (new elements shown in bold).
We compute PEC-cardinalities using the set of modified nodes: once Algorithm 2 returns, the computation continues on line 8 in Algorithm 3 where COMPUTE CARDINALITY is called for every node in Modified Nodes (line 6-7), and as it does so Modified Nodes shrinks after each call to COMPUTE CARDINALITY, until it becomes empty.
The re-computation of PEC-cardinalities works as follows. COMPUTE CARDINALITY in Algorithm 3 traverses the DAG using a queue (line 2). We initialize the PEC-cardinality of the input DAG node n by counting the packets in its associated element (line 3), using the cardinality operator from § III-B, before subtracting the PEC-cardinality of n's descendants. To do so, the PEC-cardinality of all the modified children is computed (line 9) prior to updating n's PEC-cardinality (line 12). Since there may be multiple paths to the same node in the DAG, COMPUTE CARDINALITY uses a local variable (line 2) to ensure it does not subtract too much (line 7) as it traverses the sub-DAG rooted at COMPUTE CARDINALITY's input DAG node. By deferring the re-computation of PECcardinalities for several insertions, the computation can be n, new ← FIND OR CREATE NODE(elem) 3: if new then 4:
Modified Nodes.insert(n) 5: INSERT NODE(Root, n)
Root.elem = 6:
for n ∈ Modified Nodes do 7:
COMPUTE CARDINALITY(n ) if e is not empty then 12: n , new ← FIND OR CREATE NODE(e ) 13: Γ.insert(n ) 14: if new then 15:
Modified Nodes.insert(n ) 16: INSERT NODE(child , n ) 17: parent.children.insert(n)
18:
Modified Nodes.insert(parent) 19: max children ← 20:
for max child ∈ max children do 22: parent.children.erase(max child ) 23: n.children.insert(max child ) amortized, if so desired. Note that the set of generated PECs is invariant under the insertion order of elements. Unlike SAT/SMT solvers or BDD-based solutions-which can prove that a PECs is non-empty by finding a witness-#PEC computes PEC-cardinalities instead. In the worst case, this computation is quadratic in the size N of the DAG where N can be exponential in the number of input match conditions [28] .
E. Answering Operator Questions via PEC-based Queries
When applying a PEC-based formal network analysis technique to a set of packet headers decribed by a logical query, it is necessary to convert the query into a set of PECs. In #PEC, we perform this conversion as follows.
Foremost, we assume that each logical query is a Boolean combination of logical predicates that have the same element type (Figure 7 ) as the match conditions in the meet-semilattice. while queue is not empty do 5: n ← queue.dequeue() 6: for child ∈ n .children do 7: if child ∈ visited then 8: if child ∈ Modified Nodes then 9:
COMPUTE CARDINALITY(child ) 10: visited .insert(child ) 11: n.cardinality ←
12:
n.cardinality − child.cardinality 13: queue.enqueue(child) 14: Modified Nodes.erase(n)
If a predicate in the query is not present in the meetsemilattice, we first insert it via Algorithm 1. Under these assumptions, a query is then converted into a set of PECs by invoking Algorithm 4, a recursive function on the logical structure of the input query. We remark that our last assumption ensures that line 3 in Algorithm 4 always finds a node in the DAG, i.e., n is never null. As part of our case study ( § IV-C), we give an example of a query conversion. if query is an element type then 3: n ← FIND NODE(query) 4: return SUBTREE(n) 5: else if ∃ g : query = ¬g then 6:
Universe ← SUBTREE(Root) 7: return Universe − CONVERT TO PEC(g) 8: else if ∃ g, h : query = g ∧ h then 'g ∨ h' is similar 9: G ← CONVERT TO PECS(g) 10: H ← CONVERT TO PECS(h) 11: return G ∩ H Use '∪' for 'g ∨ h'
F. Minimality of PECs
Next, we show that the set of non-empty PECs produced by #PEC form atomic predicates in the following strict sense: Definition (Atomic Predicates [27] ). Let M be a set of predicates, each of which represents a match condition of a firewall or forwarding rule. Then M's set of atomic predicates, written A(M) = {α 1 , . . . , α k }, satisfies the following: 1) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, α i = false; 2) ( k i=0 α i ) = true; 3) α i ∧α j = false for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that i = j; 4) Each match condition p in M, where p = false, is equal to the disjunction of some subset of atomic predicates:
5) k is the minimal number such that the set A(M) = {α 1 , . . . , α k } satisfies the above four conditions.
Yang and Lam show that the set of atomic predicates is unique [27] , which they compute using BDDs. Given a set of rule match conditions that can be expressed using element types (Figure 7 ), the next theorem shows how to compute this unique and minimal set through a fundamentally different algorithm that uses lattice theory and model counting. Theorem (Optimality of #PEC). Given as input a set of match conditions M of an element type, the set of non-empty PECs constructed by #PEC forms atomic predicates A(M).
Proof. The proof can be found in [38] .
Put simply, #PEC's output is as good as APV's [27] . We re-emphasize two important assumptions: (i) match conditions must be expressed as element types (Figure 7) , and (ii) the same inputs are supplied to both tools. Condition (ii) is violated when, say, APV is allowed to pre-process forwarding rules by aggregating match conditions that are associated with the same output port. #PEC does not perform such portaggregation pre-processing step, a design decision we made because the partitioning of the packet header space would need to be re-computed every time some port is changed.
IV. EVALUATION
For our study, we experimentally evaluate different implementations of PEC-construction schemes ( § IV-A), namely: #PEC, APV, ddNF and Veriflow where possible. We evaluate both the SAT/SMT and BDD-based solutions of the PECemptiness problem as well as our counting method. As part of our evaluation, we analyze firewalls and forwarding rules collected from a variety of sources ( § IV-B). Using these datasets, we uncover real-world cases where ddNF raises false alarms and misses errors ( § IV-C), which #PEC successfully avoids. We then evaluate #PEC's performance ( § IV-D).
A. Implementations
Here we outline our implementations of PEC-emptiness checks ( § IV-A1), and APV as well as #PEC ( § IV-A2).
1) Three PEC-emptiness checking procedures: In addition to implementing #PEC's counting method, we want to evaluate the SAT/SMT and BDD-based solutions to the PEC-emptiness problem that use propositional logic to precisely encode when a PEC is empty. Their symbolic encoding works as follows.
Let x be a match condition of a rule, and denote with C x the set of direct children of element x in the DAG constructed by #PEC (recall § III-C). By construction, every child c in C x is a strict subset of x, i.e., c ⊂ x. We emphasize that, for efficiency reasons, we only consider the direct children of x, so DATASET SHORT DESCRIPTION REANNZ-IP [39] , [40] 1,159 distinct IP prefixes REANNZ-Full [39] , [40] 1,170 OpenFlow rules Azure-DC [25] 2,942 ternary 128-bit vectors Berkeley-IP [14] , [41] 584,944 distinct IP prefixes Stanford-IP [11] 197,828 distinct IP prefixes Stanford-Full [11] 2,732 ternary 128-bit vectors Diekmann [33] Thousands of 8-tuples Fig. 9 : Summary of datasets all children in C x are mutually incomparable, i.e., for any child c and c in C x , neither c ⊂ c nor c ⊂ c. To implement the propositional logic PEC-emptiness solutions, we construct the following Boolean formula: x ∧ ¬ c∈Cx c -equivalently, x ∧ ¬c 1 ∧ ¬c 2 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬c n where c 1 , c 2 , . . ., c n are x's direct children in C x . For checking the formula's satisfiability, we use a SAT/SMT solver or construct a BDD, as detailed next. Our BDD implementation uses the C++ BuDDy library. We set the intial node number and cache size by manual tuning and choosing values that yield better results. In the case of the SAT/SMT implementation, we call Z3 [42] . To avoid additional parsing overhead, we use Z3's C++ API to construct the Boolean formulas, rather than using the more standard SMT-LIB [43] or DIMACS format for SAT solvers.
As part of the Boolean encoding of element types (recall § III-B), we convert tbv<N> elements into N Boolean variables, one for each non- * ternary bit. For the conversion of set<T>, which is implemented using bitsets, we encode the disjunction of the indexes of the set bits using log 2 K Boolean variables where K is the length of the bitset. For the tuple<E 1 , . . . ,E k > encoding, we designate b = b 1 + . . . + b k Boolean variables where b j is the number of Boolean variables needed to represent E j . The final encoding is the conjunction of the Boolean encoding of each tuple coordinate.
2) Implementation of APV, ddNF and #PEC: To rigorously evaluate the performance of our tool against others, we implement a version of APV and #PEC within the same framework: we opted for Z3 [42] . Our re-implementation of APV applies the same optimizations as proposed in [28] . We do not have to re-implement ddNF, since it is already available as an opensource module in Z3. Similar to ddNF, our implementation of #PEC leverages Z3's highly optimized TBV implementation. We implement the other element types as a C++11 library, which we describe in more detail in [38] .
B. Datasets
Our evaluation uses 64 different datasets, extracted from five independently collected routing tables and firewalls collections [11] , [14] , [25] , [33] , [39] . Figure 9 categorizes our datasets according to their source of origin. Each dataset is encoded as a list of rule match conditions of a specific element type (recall Figure 7 in § III-B). Since ddNF only supports TBVs, we encode the match conditions in our datasets as TBVs whenever possible, which is feasible for all datasets except the 'Diekmann' dataset, as described below. Irrespective of the element type, we ensure all match conditions per dataset are unique, since duplicates could be processed with almost zero cost. We describe each category of dataset in turn. a) REANNZ: The REANNZ-Full dataset [39] contains more than a thousand OpenFlow rules, extracted from a single routing table that was used in the Cardigan deployment [40] . The OpenFlow rules in the REANNZ dataset use the following header fields: source and destination MAC addresses, ethertype, source and destination IP address, IP protocol field, and source and destination TCP ports. We convert each match condition in the rules to a ternary 216-bit vector. From the full dataset, we extract REANNZ-IP which contains only IP prefixes, but also encoded as TBVs.
b) Berkeley-IP: The Berkeley-IP dataset originates from [14] where IPv4 prefixs from the RouteViews project [41] were evaluated in the context of the UC Berkeley campus network topology. Our dataset focuses only on the IPv4 prefixes, which we encode as 32-bit long TBVs. c) Azure-DC: The Azure-DC dataset [25] contains synthetic FIBs that simulate Azure-like data centers as deployed by Microsoft at that time. It contains a total of nearly 3000 match conditions, each of which is a ternary 128-bit vector. d) Stanford: The Stanford dataset originates from Stanford's backbone network [11] , which contains configurations of sixteen Cisco routers. For each router, we generate its transfer function [11] which models the static behavior of the router (including forwarding and ACLs). We then use the match conditions in the transfer function, encoded as ternary 128-bit vectors, to produce a dataset for that router (e.g Stanford-Full/boza). To measure the effect of analyzing a network containing all sixteen routers, we also combine all sixteen datasets into a single one, Stanford-Full, which contains a total of 2,732 unique ternary 128-bit vectors. In our Stanford-IP dataset, we extract the IP prefixes directly from the raw router configurations, thereby avoiding the IP prefix compression feature in HSA's transfer functions. As a result, our Stanford-IP datasets are significantly larger than the datasets used in the evaluation of HSA [11] and ddNF [28] . e) Diekmann: The Diekmann datasets contains match conditions from real-world Linux iptables rule-sets [33] . We parse the following packet header matching fields: source and destination IP prefix, source and destination port, protocol, connection state, input and output interface. We encode these as a mixture of TBVs and regular bitsets, which we combine into 8-tuples. We ignore wildcard characters for interfaces. We simplify each original iptables rule-set through a pre-processor that propagates match conditions along iptables chains in a depth-first manner, similar to function inlining. This essentially flattens a multi-chain iptables configuration into a list of match conditions without jumps and returns, so they conform to the same format as the other datasets.
C. Case Study
In this subsection, we describe real-world cases of imprecision in ddNF, all of which #PEC handles successfully. Due to space, we only illustrate a few examples (in our full study, we encountered over three dozen cases of imprecision in ddNF).
To begin with, ddNF misses 35 shadowed rules in the REANNZ dataset. We found that ddNF misses four shadowed rules in the Stanford datasets, one in each of the 'soza', 'sozb', 'yoza', and 'yozb' Cisco routers. Furthermore, in the Stanford dataset, ddNF fails to check that every packet whose destination IP address matches the IP prefix 171.64.79.160/24 is forwarded from router 'yozb' to router 'yoza'. For this query, ddNF wrongly reports that some packets with such a destination IP address are dropped. The slightly simplified relevant rules in the dataset for the 'yozb' router are as follows: Here, ddNF produces this wrong result, because the union of IP prefixes that forward to 'yoza' equals the IP prefix of the last rule that drops packets: the match condition of the last rule, therefore, is encoded as a singleton set that contains an empty PEC-the same underlying cause as described in § II-C.
As a more complicated example, consider the following human-readable form of the OpenFlow rules part in the REANNZ dataset (slightly simplified to help with readability), ordered from highest to lowest priority: The match conditions associated with these OpenFlow rules induce the DAG shown in Figure 8 . Suppose a network operator wants to answer the following query:
"Are all non-ICMP packets destined to IP prefix 210.4.214.0/23 sent to Port 1?" Formally, this query is a Boolean combination of the form 210.4.214.0/23, ANY∧¬(0.0.0.0/0, ICMP) where the first and second conjunct are elements b and c in the DAG in Figure 8 , respectively. Using Algorithm 4 in § III-E, we convert the query into the set of PECs {B, C, D}. Since B is a PEC associated with a rule that outputs the packet at port 2, ddNF concludes that the above property is violated. However, ddNF's verification result is incorrect: since B is empty no such violation can be realized in the actual network. #PEC correctly detects that the property holds. For the sake of brevity, we omit the discussion of five other, but similar, examples of imprecision in the REANNZ dataset.
D. Performance Evaluation
We evaluate #PEC's performance along two dimensions, namely: (i) time and memory usage to construct #PEC's meetsemilattice; (ii) time and memory usage for detecting empty PECs. We discuss our results in turn. 4 1) PEC-construction: We compare #PEC to APV, and Z3's implementation of ddNF. We ensure that every implementation benefits from the same optimizations ( § IV-A2). We find that #PEC consistently outperforms APV and ddNF in Z3 where, on larger datasets, the speed-up is more than 10×. For example, on the Azure-DC dataset, our re-implementation of #PEC in Z3 is approximately 30× faster than ddNF. APV times out on the Berkeley-IP dataset after 10 hours, whereas #PEC completes the PEC-construction in 45 minutes. We include in #PEC's total run-time the time it takes to check PEC-emptiness, when comparing #PEC and APV. For this .018  3  14  26  9  10  Azure-DC  2,942  5,096,869 10,450 5,086,419 3301  121  20112 47829 30  25669  4,429 5,797 2,365 2,517  Berkeley-IP  584,944  584,945  29,813 Timeout  Timeout  2709  1553  460  0.515  Timeout 302  701  227  Timeout  Stanford-IP/soza  184,682  184,682  4,841  179,841  471  347  7  82  0.119  4951  102  251  69  49  Stanford-IP/ Fig. 10 : Evaluation results for a subset of datasets. The full experimental results can be found in our technical report [38] .
comparison, we use the 39 datasets in which either APV or #PEC runs for more than 100 ms, excluding the Berkeley-IP dataset where APV times out. In 95% of these 39 cases, despite #PEC's PEC-emptiness check, #PEC is at least 10× faster than APV, and 25% of this time #PEC's speed-up is at least 100×. On average, #PEC is at least 80× faster than APV. Finally, APV and #PEC's memory usage averages out to be the same across these datasets. Figure 10 shows parts our experimental results, see [38] for the full details. The fact that #PEC outperforms APV is expected, since #PEC eliminates the per-bit overhead of BDDs. The performance difference between #PEC and Z3's implementation of ddNF, in turn, can be explained in terms of the number of intersection and subset operations required to insert a new match condition into their respective data structure: their total run-time is proportional to these operations. For example, in the Stanford-Full dataset, #PEC requires 0.4 million whereas ddNF in Z3 takes 8 million such operations, a 20× improvement. #PEC's improvement over Z3's implementation of ddNF are similar on the other datasets.
2) PEC-emptiness checking: We compare #PEC's counting method to the SAT/SMT and BDD-based solutions to checking PEC-emptiness. We evaluate the performance of PECemptiness checking using the 24 datasets in which #PEC runs for more than 100 ms. We perform the PEC-emptiness check after the PEC-construction has completed. We take extra precautions in our implementations to ensure a fair comparison ( § IV-A1). Figure 10 shows that #PEC's counting method significantly outperforms the SAT/SMT and BDD-based approaches: #PEC achieves at least a 10× speed-up compared to the SAT/SMT and BDD-based approach in over 95% of cases. On average, #PEC is at least 500× and 200× faster than the SAT/SMT and BDD-based approaches, respectively.
To understand why #PEC's cardinality-based approach outperforms the SAT/SMT and the BDD-based approaches, reconsider the IP prefixes in § II-C. Representing x, y, and z in propositional logic requires 19, 19, and 18 variable assignments respectively, corresponding to their non-wildcard bits. Just encoding Z = z − (x ∪ y) in SAT requires near 60 logic gates, excluding the task of checking satisfiability. Representing the predicates using BDDs requires the same number of BDD nodes. Assuming logical BDD operations are linear in their operand size, computing Z at least requires CPU cycles proportional to the cumulative size of the three BDDs. On the other hand, the cardinality of each predicate in the example fits into a single machine word. We need only 2 arithmetic CPU operations to compute the cardinality of Z (i.e |z| − |x| − |y|), and then check if it is zero. While in theory there are still near 60 operations performed (at the bit level), #PEC harnesses the computing power of ALUs to finish the operations in fewer CPU cycles. For example, in the Stanford-Full dataset where each node in the DAG has 3 children and 12 nodes in its subtree on average, the BDDbased approach requires 3 × 128 low-level BDD operations on average (each spanning tens of CPU instructions). By contrast, our cardinality-based approach needs at most 3 ALU operations for each subtraction. So #PEC should be at least (3×128)/(12×3) ≈ 10× faster than the BDD-based approach, and our experiments show indeed at least a 127× speed-up.
3) Comparison with Veriflow: We compare #PEC to the original implementation of Veriflow [44] . Since that implementation of Veriflow only supports a restricted form of OpenFlow rules where arbitrary per-field bitmasks are disallowed [35] , it cannot analyze the majority of our datasets. We therefore restrict our experiments with Veriflow to a simplified version of the Stanford-Full dataset. We use the default packet header field ordering in Veriflow. We ask Veriflow to only find 'Equivalence Classes' (ECs), rather than each EC's forwarding graph. In this restricted setting, Veriflow takes 41 s to create 3,778,324 ECs, using 1 GB of memory. Despite #PEC's support for arbitrary bitmasks, it is still more efficient than Veriflow, in both time (30 s) and space (0.5 GB ): specifically, #PEC constructs only 1,066,645 PECs in 27 s, and finds 44,418 empty PECs in 3s.
E. Discussion: Importance of Empty PECs
We showed that ddNF's non-minimality of PECs is due to PECs that are empty. In our case study ( § IV-C), we exemplified real-word cases where empty PECs lead to wrong analysis results, which are very likely to hinder technology adoption [45] . We emphasize that we only gave illustrative examples; our list is not exhaustive, and it includes cases where ddNF misses errors. In practice, therefore, ddNF is only as fast as the slowest decision procedure needed to sanity check its results, a fundamental limitation. By contrast, #PEC's analysis is correct by construction ( § III-F), and its performance is not dependent on BDDs or SAT/SMT solvers, which are orders of magnitude slower in finding empty PECs ( § IV-D2).
V. RELATED WORK Similar to APV [27] and ddNF [28] , #PEC has many potential applications in the field of network correctness. The literature in this field is vast and includes BGP configuration checking (e.g., [7] , [46] - [53] ), ACL misconfiguration detection (e.g., [54] , [55] ), firewall checking (e.g., [17] , [18] , [21] , [56] ), SDN verification (e.g., [20] , [23] , [57] , [58] ), testing (e.g., [2] , [59] - [62] ), debugging (e.g., [63] , [64] ), differential analysis (e.g., [65] ), concurrency analysis (e.g [66] , [67] ), automatic repair (e.g., [68] - [70] ), synthesis (e.g. [71] - [73] ), programming languages (e.g. [74] - [78] ), safe network updates (e.g., [79] - [82] ), data plane checking (e.g., [10] , [11] , [16] , [25] ), real-time checkers [12] , [14] , [30] , [83] , and more general network analyses (e.g., [6] , [8] , [9] , [19] , [84] , [85] ) together with suitable levels of abstractions (e.g., [86] , [87] ).
Our work is most closely related to ddNF [28] , APV [27] , Delta-net [14] and Veriflow [30] , since they all partition packet headers somehow. However, these formal network analysis tools also differ in important ways, as summarized by Figure 11 using characteristics, which are divided into three blocks: (i) whether the analysis is precise PECs remain the same when the priority or output port of rules change; (ii) common kinds of match conditions of practical interest; and (iii) finally, attributes of the underlying algorithms. We discuss each of these tools in turn: a) ddNF [28] : #PEC achieves precision when ddNF cannot. Furthermore, we have shown that #PEC can detect shadowed rules, whereas ddNF cannot in general. As a result, #PEC can verify equivalence of forwarding tables, whereas ddNF cannot. We have also shown that #PEC is more expres- Fig. 11 : Feature comparison of closest related work sive than ddNF in the kind of match conditions supported, e.g., iptables rule-sets. The DAG produced by #PEC can be shown to be isomorphic to ddNF's, but #PEC is up to 30× faster than ddNF in constructing it ( § IV). b) APV [27] : APV produces PECs in the form of atomic predicates, the smallest partition of the packet header space. #PEC also constructs the fewest PECs ( § III-F), and it does so 10× faster than APV ( § IV-D). Through an optional preprocessing step, APV may further reduce the problem size by aggregating match conditions per output port. However, when the priority or the output port of a rule changes, so would atomic predicates for the entire network then. By contrast, #PEC and ddNF only create PECs that are invariant under changes to the priority of rules and/or their actions. As explained in the introduction, APV's PEC-construction algorithm is not negation-free, explaining why it relies on BDDs [31] , [32] , whereas neither #PEC nor ddNF do.
c) Delta-net [14] : Delta-net is specifically designed for real-time analysis of large-scale BGP-controlled data centers [88] . It only supports forwarding rules that match packets based on ranges, possibly with arbitrary lower and upper bounds (unlike ddNF). Due to its limited expressiveness, Delta-net achieves quasi-linear time complexity, whereas ddNF and #PEC's higher expressiveness has an exponential worst-case time complexity. In addition, unlike ddNF and #PEC, Delta-net's run-time is independent of the order in which match conditions are inserted. Delta-net exploits the fact that the negation of a range can be efficiently computed, so its PEC-construction scheme is not negation-free. d) Veriflow [30] : Veriflow uses a multi-dimensional trie data structure to represent PECs. To do so efficiently, Veriflow imposes assumption that prevent it from analyzing most multidimensional match conditions in our datasets ( § IV-D). The PECs constructed by Veriflow depend on the order of levels in the multi-dimensional tries, which can render its memory usage and run-time performance unpredictable.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our case study ( § IV-C) and experiments ( § IV-D) reveal the tension between precision, expressiveness and performance: Veriflow and ddNF impose assumptions that prevent them from analyzing most of our dataset, and ddNF's analysis is imprecise. By contrast, APV is very expressive and precise but significantly slower than Veriflow and ddNF. Our work offers a new lattice-theoretical, algorithmic framework for formal network analysis that is expressive, precise and fast, thereby addressing a longstanding problem that has spanned three generations of formal network analysis tools.
To achieve this, we identified and efficiently solved the coNP-hard problem [38] of deciding whether a PEC is empty or not. We showed that both SAT/SMT and BDD-based solutions to this problem perform poorly. This lead to #PEC, which uses a model counting method that is 10 − 100× faster than the SAT/SMT and BDD-based solutions. In addition, #PEC constructs the unique minimal number of PECs, and it does so 10× faster than APV's atomic predicates.
